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Abstract
With the rapid increase in cloud computing, concerns sur-
rounding data privacy, security, and confidentiality also have
been increased significantly. Not only cloud providers are
susceptible to internal and external hacks, but also in some
scenarios, data owners cannot outsource the computation due
to privacy laws such as GDPR, HIPAA, or CCPA. Fully Ho-
momorphic Encryption (FHE) is a groundbreaking invention
in cryptography that, unlike traditional cryptosystems, en-
ables computation on encrypted data without ever decrypting
it. However, the most critical obstacle in deploying FHE at
large-scale is the enormous computation overhead.
In this paper, we present HEAX, a novel hardware archi-
tecture for FHE that achieves unprecedented performance
improvement. HEAX leverages multiple levels of paral-
lelism, ranging from ciphertext-level to fine-grained modu-
lar arithmetic level. Our first contribution is a new highly-
parallelizable architecture for number-theoretic transform
(NTT) which can be of independent interest as NTT is fre-
quently used in many lattice-based cryptography systems.
Building on top of NTT engine, we design a novel architecture
for computation on homomorphically encrypted data. We also
introduce several techniques to enable an end-to-end, fully
pipelined design as well as reducing on-chip memory con-
sumption. Our implementation on reconfigurable hardware
demonstrates 164-268× performance improvement for a wide
range of FHE parameters.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has, in a short time, fundamentally changed
the economics of computing. It allows businesses to quickly
and efficiently scale to almost arbitrary-sized workloads; small
organizations no longer need to own, secure, and maintain their
own servers. However, cloud computing comes with signif-
icant risks that have been analyzed in the literature over the
last decade (see [26, 40, 70]). Specifically, many of these risks
revolve around data security and privacy. For example, data in
cloud storage might be exposed to both outsider and insider
threats, and be prone to both intentional and unintentional
misuse by the cloud provider. Recently, the European Union
and the State of California have passed strong data privacy
regulations. In this light, companies and organizations that
possess highly private data are hesitant to migrate to the cloud,
and cloud providers are facing increasing liability concerns.
To mitigate security and privacy concerns, cloud providers
should keep customers’ data encrypted at all times. Symmetric-
key encryption schemes, such as Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) [23], allow private data to be stored securely in a
public cloud indefinitely. However, unless the customers share
their secret keys with the cloud, the cloud becomes merely
a storage provider. In other cases, the customers may want
to securely transmit data to the cloud using protocols such as
Transport Layer Security (TLS), but give the cloud access to
the unencrypted data for outsourced processing. While this
model unlocks the key benefits of cloud computing, it at the
same time weakens the customer’s data privacy compared to a
cloud that only provides an encrypted storage functionality.
In 2009, a new class of cryptosystems, called Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption (FHE) [34], was introduced that allows ar-
bitrary computation on encrypted data. This ground-breaking
invention enables clients to encrypt data and send ciphertexts
to a cloud that can evaluate functions on ciphertexts. Final and
intermediate results are encrypted, and only the data owner
who possesses the secret key can decrypt, providing an end-to-
end encryption for the client.
FHE provides provable security guarantees without any
trust assumptions on the cloud provider, and it can be used
to enable several secure and privacy-preserving cloud-based
solutions. For instance, in the context of Machine Learning
as a Service (MLaaS), FHE can be used to perform oblivious
neural network inference [36]: clients send the encrypted ver-
sion of their data, the cloud server runs ML models on the
encrypted queries and returns the result to the clients. All
intermediate and final results are encrypted and can only be
decrypted by the clients. Perhaps, the most critical obstacle
today to deploy FHE at large-scale is the enormous computa-
tion overhead compared to the plaintext counterpart in which
the data is not kept confidential.
Most FHE schemes, i.e., the BGV [11], the BFV [31], and
the TFHE [18] perform exact computation on encrypted data.
A recently proposed FHE scheme, called CKKS [17], performs
approximate computation of real numbers and supports effi-
cient truncation of encrypted values. Several works [51, 47]
have shown the benefits of choosing the CKKS scheme over
other schemes when an approximate computation is required,
e.g., Machine Learning applications. Therefore, we focus on
the CKKS scheme in this paper, even though our core modules
are applicable to most of FHE schemes.
In this paper, we introduce HEAX (stands for Homomorphic
Encryption Acceleration), a novel high-performance architec-
ture for computing on (homomorphically) encrypted data. We
design several optimized core computation blocks for fast
modular arithmetic. HEAX introduces a new architecture for
high-throughput Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT). NTT is
a ubiquitous operation in FHE as well as many lattice-based
cryptography systems. Efficient NTT engine directly improves
the performance of these cryptosystems since NTT operation
is usually the computational bottleneck. Building on top of
NTT module, we design modules to perform high-level opera-
tions supported by FHE schemes, thus, accelerating any secure
and privacy-preserving application that is based on FHE.
Prior Art and Challenges. In FHE schemes, the ciphertext is
a set (usually a pair) of polynomials with degree n−1 (vector
of n integers) modulo a big integer. One of the main challenges
of designing an architecture for FHE is that homomorphic
operations on ciphertexts involve computationally intensive
modular arithmetic on big integers (with several hundred bits).
These operations have convoluted data dependency among
different parts of the computation, making it challenging to
design a high-throughput architecture. Moreover, the degree
of the underlying polynomials is enormous (in the order of
several thousand). Storing the entire intermediate results on
FPGA chip is prohibitive for small encryption parameters and
is infeasible for large parameters, given the fact that memory
consumption grows as O
(
n3
)
.
Prior work that propose customized hardware for non-
CKKS schemes have taken one of these approaches: (i) De-
signing co-processors that only accelerate certain lower-level
ring operations [21, 20, 74, 14, 30, 45]. High-level opera-
tions are performed on the CPU-side, which makes the co-
processors of limited practical use. (ii) Storing intermediate
results on off-chip memory, which significantly degrades the
performance [60] to the extent that it can be worse than naive
software execution [66]. (iii) Designing a hardware for a fixed
modest-sized parameter, e.g., n = 212 [67]. However, encryp-
tion parameters determine the security-level and the maximum
number of consecutive multiplications that one can perform on
ciphertext, both of which are application-dependent. One of
our primary design goals in HEAX is to have an architecture
that can be readily used for a wide range of encryption param-
eters. In addition, we propose several techniques to efficiently
store and access data from on-chip memory and minimize (or
eliminate for some parameter sets) off-chip memory accesses.
Client-Side and Server-Side Computation. The homomor-
phic property of FHE enables the cloud server to perform
various operations without having access to the secret key, i.e.,
not decrypting it. In other words, the cloud server can per-
form certain transformations on ciphertexts that are equivalent
to performing computation on their corresponding plaintext
values. For example, adding two ciphertexts results in the
encryption of “summation of two underlying plaintext values”.
However, multiplication is significantly more complicated.
Multiplication increases the number of polynomials in the
ciphertext; requiring an operation, called relinearization, to
transform the ciphertext back to a pair of polynomials. In
order to benefit from SIMD-style operations, an encoding step
is performed by the client to embed many numbers in a sin-
gle ciphertext. CKKS scheme supports rotation in which the
numbers embedded in the ciphertext can be rotated circularly
(without decrypting the ciphertext).
Note that encoding, decoding, encryption, and decryption
are performed on the client-side. These operations are not com-
putationally expensive; thus, we do not implement customized
hardware for these operations. Besides, it may not be realis-
tic to assume that all clients have access to a reconfigurable
hardware. The operations that are performed by the server
for evaluating a function on ciphertexts, i.e., multiplication,
relinearization, and rotation, are computationally intensive and
are the focus of our work.
Contributions. In what follows, we elaborate on our major
contributions in more detail:
• We design a novel architecture for number-theoretic trans-
form (NTT) which is a fundamental building block – and
usually the computation bottleneck – for many lattice-based
cryptosystems including all FHE schemes. Our design
is generic and can process arbitrary-sized polynomials
with an adjustable throughput. We develop several tech-
niques to overcome the challenges due to the complex data-
dependency and convoluted access patterns within NTT.
• We introduce the first architecture for CKKS homomorphic
encryption. We leverage multi-layer parallelism design start-
ing from ciphertext-level to fine-grained optimized modular
arithmetic engines. In contrast to the prior art for other
FHE schemes, our architecture can be scaled for different
FPGA chips due to its modularity. Moreover, HEAX is not
custom-designed for specific FHE parameter set and can be
used for a broad range of parameters.
• We provide a proof-of-concept implementation on two Intel
FPGAs that represent two different classes of FPGAs in
terms of available resources. We implement all high-level
operations supported by CKKS and evaluate our design for
three sets of parameters which account for the vast majority
of practical applications. Our experimental results demon-
strate more than two orders of magnitude performance im-
provement compared to heavily-optimized Microsoft SEAL
library running on CPU.
Paper Outline. Section 2 provides the notation in the paper
as well as a brief background on a few concepts. In Section 3,
a detailed description of algorithms in CKKS scheme is pro-
vided. We describe our proposed architectures in Section 4,
and in Section 5, we elaborate on system-view and data flow.
In Section 6, resource utilization and performance of our proof-
of-concept implementation is provided. We categorize and
explain prior art in Section 7.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
Notation. Throughout the paper, integers and real numbers
are written in normal case, e.g. q. Polynomials and vectors are
written in bold, e.g. a. Vectors of polynomials and matrices
are written in upper-case bold, e.g. A. We use subscripts to
denote the indices, e.g. ai is the i-th polynomial or row of A.
We assume that n is a power-of-two integer and define
a polynomial ring R = Z[X ]/(Xn+1) whose elements have
degrees at most n−1 since Xn =−1∈R. We write Rq =R/qR
for the residue ring of R modulo an integer q whose elements
have coefficients in [−b(q−1)/2c , bq/2c]∩Z. In the actual
computation, we represent coefficients in [0, q−1]∩Z. We
denote by u ·v the multiplication of two polynomials where
the product is reduced modulo Xn+1 in R and further reduced
modulo q in Rq. We denote by 〈u, v〉 the dot product of
two vectors, which gives ∑i ui ·vi. We denote by u v the
coefficient-wise multiplication (u0 ·v0, u1 ·v1, . . .).
For a real number r, bre denotes the nearest integer to r
(rounding upwards in case of a tie), and brc is the largest
integer smaller than or equal to r. For an integer a, [a]p denotes
the reduction of a modulo an integer p to [0, p−1]∩Z. These
operations are also applied on a vector of real/integer numbers.
All logarithms are in base two unless otherwise indicated.
We use a← χ to denote sampling a according to distribution χ .
For a finite set S, U(S) denotes the uniform distribution on S,
e.g., a←U(Rq) denotes sampling a uniformly from elements
of Rq. All appearances of p denote a word-sized prime number.
q denotes a product of word-sized prime numbers.
Residue Number System (RNS). There is a well-known tech-
nique to achieve asymptotic/practical improvements in polyno-
mial arithmetic over Rq with an RNS by choosing q =∏Li=0 pi
where pi’s are pair-wise coprime integers, based on the ring
isomorphism Rq 7→ ∏Li=0 Rpi . We denote the RNS repre-
sentation of an element a ∈ Rq by A =
(
ai = [a]pi
)
0≤i≤L
∈
∏Li=0 Rpi . The inverse mapping is defined based on the for-
mula a=∑Li=0 aipii
[
pi−1i
]
pi
(mod q), where pii = qpi . Multipli-
cations or additions in Rq, denoted by c = Func(a,b), can be
performed on their RNS representation: for all i = 0,1, . . . ,L,
compute ci = Func(ai,bi) in Rpi . There exist full-RNS vari-
ants of HE schemes, such as those in [7, 37, 16], which do not
require any RNS conversions except in decryption and show
significant improvement over non-RNS variants. On platforms
such as GPUs and FPGAs, the advantage of full-RNS variants
is more significant. We can execute ci = Func(ai,bi) for all
i’s in parallel. Thus, the amount of memory to store temporary
data is reduced to the size of Rpi elements.
Gadget Decomposition. Let g ∈ Zd be a gadget vector and
q an integer. The gadget decomposition, denoted by g−1,
is a function from Rq to Rd which transforms an element
a ∈ Rq into A ∈ Rd , a vector of small polynomials such that
a = 〈g,A〉 (mod q). We integrate the RNS-friendly gadget
decomposition from [7, 37].
3. METHODOLOGY and ALGORITHMS
HEAX targets a full-RNS variant of the CKKS scheme. RNS
support was introduced in [16] and provided a performance
boost. Three instances of the CKKS scheme are currently
available, namely Microsoft SEAL [69], HEAAN [39], and
HElib [41] libraries. We choose Microsoft SEAL because the
other two are not fully based on RNS, i.e., have dependencies
on multi-precision integer operations.
In this section, we summarize the algorithms in HEAX that
implement the CKKS scheme’s evaluation primitives as im-
plemented in Microsoft SEAL [69]. Throughout the section,
"CKKS." is a prefix to CKKS specific methods. For example,
symmetric-key encryption SymEnc is not prefixed since it is
not specific to CKKS but rather a standard operation cryp-
tosystems based on Ring Learning with Errors [54]. In text,
methods are described without RNS or NTT forms for read-
ability. In implementation and algorithms, polynomials are
represented in RNS throughout evaluation and in NTT rep-
resentation whenever possible. For completeness, we briefly
cover the non-evaluation primitives of CKKS here. Our focus,
evaluation primitives, are explained in subsections.
• CKKS.Setup(λ ): For a security parameter λ , set a ring
dimension n, a ciphertext modulus q, a special modulus p
coprime to q, and a key distribution χ and an error distribution
Ω over R.
• SymEnc(m, sk): Let m ∈ R be an input plaintext and sk=
s ∈ Rqp be a secret key. Sample a← U(Rqp) and e← Ω.
Compute b = −a ·s+ e ∈ Rqp. Return the ciphertext ct =
(c0, c1) = (b, a).
• CKKS.KeyGen(): Sample s← χ . Return a secret key sk= s
and a public key pk= SymEnc(0, sk).
• CKKS.Enc(m, pk): Let m ∈ R be an input plaintext and
pk = (b, a) ∈ R2qp be a public key. Sample u ← χ and
e0, e1 ← Ω. Compute (c′0, c′1) = u ·(b, a) + (e0, e1)
(mod qp). Return ciphertext ct = (c0, c1) = (m, 0) +⌊
(c′0, c
′
1)/p
⌋ ∈ R2q.
• CKKS.Dec(ct, sk): Let ct = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q` be a cipher-
text at the `-th level,where q` = ∏`i=0 pi, return c0 + c1 ·s
(mod q`).
• KskGen(sk′,sk): Let sk= s ∈ Rqp be the generated secret
key, sk′ = s′ ∈ Rqp be a different key, and a gadget vector g ∈
Zd . Return a key switching key ksk= (D0 | D1) ∈ R(L+2)×2q`p ,
where (d0,i, d1,i)← SymEnc(gi ·s′, s) for i= 0, 1, . . . , d−1.
• CKKS.RlkGen(sk): Let sk= s∈Rqp be the generated secret
key, and a gadget vector g ∈ Zd . Return a relinearization key
rlk← KskGen(s2, s).
• CKKS.GlkGen(sk,step): Let sk= s∈Rqp be the generated
secret key, step ∈ Z be the number of steps that a ciphertext
is supposed to be shifted (positive for left-handed shifting,
negative for right-handed shifting), and a gadget vector g∈Zd .
Compute a key s′ ∈ Rqp based on s and step (see [10] for de-
tails). Return a Galois (or rotation) key glk← KskGen(s2, s).
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Algorithm 1 Standard Barrett Reduction
Input: p < 2w, x ∈ [0,(p−1)2]∩Z, and u = ⌊22w/p⌋
Output: z← x (mod p)
1: α ← ⌊α/22w⌋ . discard the lowest two words
2: zε ← α · p . double-word multiplication
3: z← x− zε . double-word subtraction
4: if z≥ p then
5: z← z− p
6: end if
Algorithm 2 Optimized Modular Multiplication
Input: p < 2w−2, x,y ∈ Zp, and y′ = by ·2w/pc
Output: z← x ·y (mod p)
1: z← x ·y (mod 2w) . the lower word of the product
2: t← bx ·y′/2wc . the upper word of the product
3: zε ← t · p (mod 2w) . the lower word of the product
4: z← z− zε . single-word subtraction
5: if z≥ p then
6: z← z− p
7: end if
3.1. Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT)
Computing c = a ·b ∈ Rp is equivalent to computing the ne-
gacyclic convolution of their coefficient vectors in Znp: c j =
∑ ji=0 aib j−i−∑n−1i− j+1 aib j−i+n (mod p), j = 0, 1, . . . , n−1.
For a large n, which is at least 4096 in our implementation, it
is asymptotically better to use the convolution theorem and
perform a specific form of fast Fourier transform, i.e., NTT,
over a finite field. Polynomials are kept in NTT form to reduce
the number of NTT and its inverse (INTT) conversions. Fast
NTT algorithms are well studied in lattice-based cryptography.
We adapt the algorithms in [52] (Section 2.2) which analyzes
fast NTT algorithms and introduces specific optimizations
for negacyclic convolution. For a ring degree n, we choose
a prime number p = 1 mod 2n such that there exists a 2n-th
primitive root of unity ψ , i.e., ψn =−1 mod p.
There are optimizations to integer modular multiplication in
the Microsoft SEAL library, which differ from those in [52].
• Mod(x, p): For a modulus p with at most w bits, given
an integer x ∈ [0, (p−1)2], precompute u = ⌊22w/p⌋, and
compute z = x (mod p). We omit u from function inputs for
simplicity. This follows the Barrett reduction algorithm in [8].
It can be used to reduce a single-word or double-word integer.
Mod(a, p) performs Mod(ai, p) for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n−1.
• MulRed(x, y, y′, p): For w-bit words and a modulus p <
2w−2, given x, y ∈ Zp and precomputed y′ = by ·2w/pc, com-
pute x ·y (mod p) according to Algorithm 2. MulRed opti-
mizes modular multiplications when one of the operands is
a known constant, e.g., a power of the root of unity, that can
be precomputed. Compared to Mod, this algorithm has less
multi-word operations, hence, it is faster.
The value of w is chosen as 54 in HEAX as opposed to 64
in Microsoft SEAL. We explain the reason in more detail in
Algorithm 3 NTT
Input: a ∈ Znp, p≡ 1 mod 2n, Y ∈ Znp storing powers of ψ
in bit-reverse order, and Y′ = bY ·2w/pc.
Output: : a˜← NTTp(a) in bit-reverse ordering.
1: for (m = 1; m < n; m = 2m) do
2: for (i = 0; i < m; i++) do
3: for ( j = i·nm ; j < (2i+1)n2m ; j++) do
4: v = MulRed(a j+ nm , ym+i, y
′
m+i, p)
5: a j+ nm = a j− v (mod p)
6: a j = a j + v (mod p)
7: end for
8: end for
9: end for
10: a˜← a
Algorithm 4 INTT
Input: a˜∈Znp, p≡ 1 mod 2n, Y∈Znp storing powers ofψ−1
divided by 2 in bit-reverse order, and Y′ = bY ·2w/pc.
Output: : a← INTTp(a˜) in bit-reverse ordering.
1: for (m = n/2; m≥ 1; m = m/2) do
2: for (i = 0; i < m; i++) do
3: for ( j = i·nm ; j < (2i+1)n2m ; j++) do
4: v = a˜ j− a˜ j+ nm (mod p)
5: a˜ j = (a˜ j + a˜ j+ nm )/2 (mod p)
6: a˜ j+ nm = MulRed(v, ym+i, y
′
m+i, p)
7: end for
8: end for
9: end for
10: a← a˜
Section 4. Modulus p has at most 52 bits.
• NTTp(a): Given a ∈ Znp, compute a˜ ∈ Znp such that a˜ j =
∑n−1i=0 aiψ
(2i+1) j, according to Algorithm 3.
• INTTp(a˜): Given a˜ ∈ Znp, compute a ∈ Znp such that a j =
1
n ∑
n−1
i=0 a˜iψ
−(2i+1) j, according to Algorithm 4.
3.2. Addition and Multiplication
These two operations are performed in RNS and NTT form:
• CKKS.Add(ct0, ct1): Given ciphertexts ct0, ct1 ∈ R2q` en-
crypting pt0, pt1 ∈ R, generate ct′ = ct0+ct1 ∈ R2q` which
is equivalent to the encryption of pt0+pt1 ∈ R.
• CKKS.Mul(ct0, ct1): Given ciphertexts ct0, ct1 ∈ R2q`
encrypting pt0, pt0 ∈ R, generate ct′ ∈ R3q` according to
Algorithm 5 which encrypts pt0 ·pt1 ∈ R.
3.3. Rescaling
In CKKS, a plaintext is the encoding of message slots mul-
tiplied by a scale ∆. Note that by multiplying plaintexts, ci-
phertexts, or a plaintext and a ciphertext, their scales are also
multiplied. Therefore, the scale grows exponentially on the
number of multiplications. It will quickly grow larger than qL,
which causes decryption failure. Besides, adding two operands
with different scales produces an incorrect result. Rescaling
4
Algorithm 5 Ciphertext Multiplication
Input: ct0 = (A˜0, A˜1), ct1 = (B˜0, B˜1) ∈ (∏`i=0 Rpi)2
Output: ct= (C˜0, C˜1, C˜2) ∈ (∏`i=0 Rpi)3
1: for (i = 0; i≤ `; i = i+1) do
2: c˜0,i← Mod(a˜0,i b˜0,i, pi)
3: c˜1,i← Mod(a˜0,i b˜1,i+ a˜1,i b˜0,i, pi)
4: c˜2,i← Mod(a˜1,i b˜1,i, pi)
5: end for
Algorithm 6 RNS Flooring
Input: C˜ = (c˜0, . . . , c˜`+1) ∈ Znp0 ×·· ·×Znp` ×Znp.
Output: C˜′ = (c˜′0, . . . , c˜
′
`) ∈ Znp0 ×·· ·×Znp` .
1: a← INTTp(c˜`+1)
2: for (i = 0; i≤ `; i = i+1) do
3: r← Mod(a, pi)
4: r˜← NTTpi(r)
5: c˜′i← c˜i− r˜ (mod pi)
6: c˜′i← Mod
([
p−1
]
pi
· c˜′i, pi
)
7: end for
changes (mostly reduces) the scale of a ciphertext. In order to
support full-RNS, rescaling changes the scale by a set of fixed
ratios, i.e., one of the RNS prime numbers.
• Floor(C˜, p): Given C˜, the RNS and NTT form of c ∈ Rq`p,
generate C˜′, the RNS and NTT form of c′ =
⌊
p−1 ·c⌋ ∈ Rq`
according to Algorithm 6.
• CKKS.Rescale(ct): Given a ciphertext ct = (C˜0, C˜1) ∈
R2q` with scale ∆, generate a new ciphertext ct
′ =
(Floor(C˜0), Floor(C˜1)) ∈ R2q`−1 with scale ∆/p` in RNS
and NTT form.
3.4. Key Switching
Key switching is a technique to make a ciphertext decryptable
with a different secret key homomorphically. Various gad-
get decomposition methods can be adopted to balance noise
growth and execution time. Given qd−1, the product of co-
prime integers p0, . . . , pd−1, and q` divides qd−1, define gad-
get decomposition Rq` 7→ Rd as g−1(a) =
(
[a]pi
)
0≤i≤d−1
, and
gadget vector as g =
(
pii
[
pi−1i
]
pi
)
0≤i≤d−1
where pii =
qd−1
pi
.
This choice of gadget decomposition contributes to a fast key
switching and high noise growth. With the special modulus p
and a rescaling at the end of key switching, explained in [15],
key switching is almost noise-free.
• KeySwitch(ct, ksk): Given a ciphertext ct = (c0,c1) ∈
R2q` decryptable with secret key s and a key switching key
ksk = (D0 | D1) ∈ R(L+2)×2q`p , where | appends one column
vector to another, generate a new ciphertext ct′ = (c′0, c
′
1) ∈
R2q` decryptable with secret key s
′ as follows:
1. A← g−1` (c1) =
(
[c1]p0 , . . . , [c1]p`
)
∈ R`.
2. (c′′0 , c
′′
1)← (〈A, D0〉 , 〈A, D1〉) ∈ R2q`p.
Algorithm 7 Key Switching
Input: ct = (C˜0, C˜1) ∈ (∏`i=0 Rpi)2, and ksk =((
D˜i,0
)
0≤i≤L+1
∣∣ (D˜i,1)0≤i≤L+1) ∈ (p∏Li=0 Rpi)(L+2)×2
Output: ct′ = (C˜′0, C˜
′
1) ∈ (∏`i=0 Rpi)2
1: a zero ciphertext ct′′ = (C˜′′0 , C˜
′′
1) ∈ (p∏`i=0 Rpi)2
2: for (i = 0; i≤ `; i = i+1) do
3: a← INTTpi(c˜1,i)
4: for ( j = 0; j ≤ `; j = j+1) do
5: if i 6= j then
6: b← Mod(a, p j)
7: b˜← NTTp j(b)
8: else
9: b˜← a˜
10: end if
11: c˜′′0, j← c˜′′0, j + b˜ d˜i,0, j (mod p j)
12: c˜′′1, j← c˜′′1, j + b˜ d˜i,1, j (mod p j)
13: end for
14: b← Mod(a p)
15: b˜← NTTp(b)
16: c˜′′0,`+1← c˜′′0,`+1+ b˜ d˜0,i,L+1 (mod p j)
17: c˜′′1,`+1← c˜′′1,`+1+ b˜ d˜1,i,L+1 (mod p j)
18: end for
19: ct′← (Floor(C˜′′0 , p), Floor(C˜′′1 , p))
20: ct′← CKKS.Add(ct, ct′)
3. ct′ = (c′0,c
′
1)← (Floor(c′′0 , p),Floor(c′′1 , p)) ∈ R2q` .
4. ct′← CKKS.Add(ct′, ct).
The input and output ciphertext and the key switching key
are in RNS representation and in the NTT form. Algorithm 7
describes the full-RNS variant.
Relinearization. Multiplying two ciphertexts generates a ci-
phertext ct′ ∈ R3q` with three components (Algorithm 5). ct′
can be decrypted as
〈
ct′, (1, s, s2)
〉
in Rq` where s is the
secret key. To stop ciphertexts from expanding, we relinearize
the ciphertext to transform it back to two components. Re-
linearization is fundamentally a key-switching operation. It
transforms a ciphertext decryptable with s2 to a new ciphertext
decryptable with s using relinearization key.
• CKKS.Relin(ct, rk): Given a ciphertext (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2) ∈
(∏`i=0 Rpi)3 and a relinearization key rk (can be seen as ksk),
generates a ciphertext (c˜′0, c˜
′
1) ∈ (∏`i=0 Rpi)2 as follows:
1. Compute ct∗ = KeySwitch(c˜2, rk) ∈ R2q−1.
2. c˜′0← c˜0+ c˜∗0, c˜′1← c˜1+ c˜∗1.
Rotation. A plaintext is the encoding of a vector of messages
that are evaluated independently. Rotation is applied on a
ciphertext to move messages across slots. Each rotation pattern
has a corresponding secret key s′ derived from the original
secret key s. Rotation generates a ciphertext that after being
decrypted with s′ is the encoding of the rotated message vector.
The single costly part of rotation is also KeySwitch. We refer
readers to [17] and [10] for more details.
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4. ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe our proposed architectures for
NTT/INTT, Multiplication, and Key Switching modules.
Word Size and Native Operations. Microsoft SEAL li-
brary [69] is developed for x86 architectures with 64-bit native
operations. However, on FPGAs, the bit-width of Digital Sig-
nal Processing (DSP) units that perform multiplication may
vary, and hence, it is more efficient to have a different bit-
width for native operations. For example, the two FPGA chips
that we have implemented our architecture on have 27-bit
DSP units. Choosing 27 or 54-bit multiplications as our native
operation enables us to use less DSP units to do the same
computation. Naive construction of a 64-bit multiplier re-
quires nine 27-bit DSPs. Whereas, a 54-bit multiplier requires
only four. However, by reducing the bit-width of the RNS
components, one may need to increase the number of such
components; roughly speaking, by a factor of 6454 ≈ 1.2.
In practice, small ciphertext moduli are usually less than 54
bits and thus, we do not need to increase the number of mod-
uli. It is worth-mentioning that leveraging more sophisticated
multi-word multiplication algorithms such as Toom-Cook, one
can implement 64-bit multiplication using five 27-bit multi-
pliers together with more bit-level and Addition operations.
Overall, by switching from 64-bit native operations to 54-bit,
we observe between 1.4× to 2.25× reduction in the number of
DSP units needed (depending on the HE parameters). Please
note that with 54-bit word size, we need to make sure all of
the ciphertext moduli (pi) are (i) less than 52-bit to ensure the
correctness of Algorithm 2 and (ii) congruent to 1 mod 2n to
support NTT as described in Section 3.1. We have precom-
puted all of such moduli for different parameters.
4.1. MULT Module
We first describe the architecture of the MULT module
which can process both ciphertext-ciphertext (C-C) as well as
ciphertext-plaintext (C-P) homomorphic multiplications. In
what follows, we discuss the architecture for C-C multiplica-
tion as C-P is a special case of C-C. In Microsoft SEAL, to
achieve superior performance, ciphertexts and plaintexts are
in NTT form by default and are converted back to the original
form only if needed. Therefore, homomorphic multiplication
is simply a series of dyadic multiplications on different com-
ponents of two input ciphertexts as described in Algorithm 5.
The MULT module, depicted in Figure 1, encompasses
ncDYD-many Dyadic Cores (nc stands for number of cores).
Therefore, MULT module can compute ncDYD dyadic multipli-
cation at each clock cycle. Each Dyadic core takes as input two
polynomial coefficients (Op1 and Op2), two precomputed con-
stant values (R1 and R2), and one-word prime p and outputs
the multiplication result.
In a general case, each ciphertext can have more than two
components. For example, consider a scenario where ct1 (or
ct2) is the output of a previous C-C Mult (not relinearized)
and now has three components. Let us denote the number of
components in ct1 and ct2 by α and β , respectively. The
outcome of homomorphic multiplication is a ciphertext with
α + β − 1 components. Each ciphertext component is rep-
resented in a RNS form. Recall that in homomorphic multi-
plication (Algorithm 5), the computation can be carried out
independently on each RNS basis of two ciphertexts and we
leverage this property to reduce BRAM utilization. Minimum
BRAM utilization is achieved by storing one residue of each
ciphertext component. However, this approach significantly
increases data transfer from CPU to FPGA from (α +β ) ·n
words to (α ·β +min(α, β )) ·n words since we need to com-
pute all pairwise combinations of ct1 and ct2 components.
Thus, we allocate α-many memories of size n for ct1 and
β -many memories for ct2 to hold one residue of all cipher-
text components. As a result, we achieve O
(
(α+β ) ·n) data
transfer and BRAM consumption.
In order to fully utilize all ncDYD Dyadic cores – regardless
of the values of α and β – we read ncDYD coefficients from
one of the polynomials of ct1 and ct2 at every clock cycle.
However, each unit of on-chip memory, i.e., Block RAMs
(BRAM), only supports one read and one write at each clock
cycle. In order to read many coefficients from one polynomial
at each cycle, we store each polynomial across ncDYD-many
parallel memory blocks that share common read/write address
signals as depicted in Figure 1. Let us call the aggregation of
one row among different BRAMs as a memory element (ME).
Therefore, at every cycle, one memory element (ME1/ME2)
is read from ct1/ct2 memory banks and the result (ME3) is
written to a separate output memory.
4.2. NTT Module
NTT/INTT is the most computationally intensive low-level
operation in homomorphic encryption schemes. In what fol-
lows, we use NTT to refer to both NTT and INTT modules.
At the end of this section, we discuss the differences between
these two modules. As can be seen from Algorithm 7, in
KeySwitch, NTT/INTT is computed many times on different
intermediate polynomials. However, the number of times that
we need to compute NTT/INTT is different in distinct parts
of the Algorithm. In order to have a fully pipelined architec-
ture, we allocate one NTT module per each NTT operation
in Algorithm 7. The relative throughput-rate among different
NTT instances also depends on the selected FHE parameters,
which is application-dependent. As a result, we need to have a
generic architecture for NTT module such that the throughput
can be adjusted as needed. This, in turn, is translated to the
number of NTT cores that is dedicated to a given NTT mod-
ule. Figure 3 shows the internal architecture of a single NTT
core which accepts two coefficients, one twiddle factor, one
precomputed value, and a prime as inputs and computes two
transformed coefficients as the outputs. From the functionality
perspective, the architecture follows Algorithms 3 and 4.
The throughput of the NTT module is proportional to the
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Figure 1: Architecture of MULT module.
number of NTT cores that it encompasses. We denote the
number of NTT cores as ncNTT. Ideally at each clock cycle,
and given full utilization of NTT cores, 2ncNTT coefficients
are transformed. Similar to MULT module, we store each
polynomial across many parallel BRAMs that share common
read/write address signals as depicted in Figure 3. This is
possible thanks to the aligned access pattern in NTT: while
access pattern changes during NTT, the number of consecutive
accesses to the polynomial is always a power of two.
Access Pattern. At high-level, the NTT module computes
NTT of a polynomial of size n in logn stages. In each stage,
the module computes the transformed result of 2ncNTT coeffi-
cients, thus, requiring n2ncNTT steps to finish one stage. How-
ever, the access pattern changes from one stage to another.
Figure 2 illustrates the two types of access patterns in NTT.
During the first logn− logncNTT−1 stages, these pairs of co-
efficients are stored in different MEs. Let us call these Type
1 stages. For instance, consider n = 4096 and ncNTT = 8, dur-
ing the first step of the first stage of NTT, x[0] (in ME0) and
x[2048] (in ME256) should be passed to the first NTT core.
More precisely, polynomial coefficient x[ j] ( j= 0, 1, ... , n2−1)
is passed together with x[ j+ n2 ] to a given NTT core. In gen-
eral, during ith stage, x[ j+m] ( j = 0, 1, ... , n21+i −1) is passed
along with x[ j+m+ n21+i ] where m ∈ { h·n2i |h = 0, 1, ..., i}.
The address of the ME that is fetched at stage i and step j in
Type 1 stages is computed in Address Logic as follows:
Addr{MEcoeff}i, j = (( j >> 1)&(2s−1))+
(( j >> (s+1))<< (s+2))+ s ·( j mod 2)
where s = logn− logncNTT−2− i, “&” is bit-wise AND opera-
tion, >> denotes right-shift, and << is left-shift.
As soon as n2i = 2ncNTT, the inter-ME data dependency no
longer exists, and pairs of coefficients are selected from within
each ME independently, i.e., Type 2 stages.
In Type 1 stages, coefficients within two fetched MEs are
always accessed in the same order. For example, the second
coefficient in each ME is always passed to the second NTT
core. However, in Type 2 stages, a coefficient at specific loca-
tion of ME is passed to a different NTT core or even different
inputs of an NTT core (cin.a or cin.b) during consecutive stages.
Therefore, coefficients have to be reordered to be passed to
NTT cores. Later in this section, we will discuss an efficient
method for reordering the coefficients. After the computations
in NTT cores, coefficients have to be reordered again and
stored in the same positions as they were accessed.
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Type 1 Type 2
ME0
ME1
ME2
ME3
Figure 2: Access pattern of Type 1 and Type 2 stages in NTT.
The access pattern for twiddle factors, i.e., Y and Y′ in Al-
gorithm 3, is different from the access pattern of coefficients.
At stage i, only 2i unique values of twiddle factors, starting at
index 2i of twiddle polynomial, are used. Since in the worst-
case scenario, ncNTT unique twiddle factors are used in a single
step of NTT, we store twiddle factors in batches of size ncNTT in
parallel as shown in Figure 3 (note that twiddle factors’ MEs
are half size of polynomial coefficients’ MEs). As a result,
we can divide the access pattern of twiddle factors into four
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Figure 3: Architecture of NTT module.
groups: (i) in the first group of stages where 2i < ncNTT, only
ME0 (first ME) is accessed throughout the stage computation
and one (or more) twiddle factor(s) is(are) broadcasted into
different NTT cores. (ii) At stage logncNTT, only ME1 is ac-
cessed but no broadcast is needed as each twiddle factor inside
ME is passed to a separate NTT core. (iii) During stages where
logncNTT < i < logn− 1, 2i−logncNTT unique MEs are fetched
and passed to NTT cores, and finally, (iv) at stage logn−1, a
new ME of twiddle factors is read from BRAM at every step.
The address of the twiddle factor ME that is fetched at stage i
and step j is computed in Address Logic as follows:
Addr{MEw}i, j =( j>> (logn−1−i))+(1<< ( j−logncNTT))
Reordering Coefficients and Customized Multiplexers.
During Type 1 stages, once the ME is fetched, passing each
coefficient in ME to the right NTT core (and right input wire)
is straightforward and it can be summarized as follows:c
`
in.a = MEe[`+( j mod 2) ·ncNTT]
c`in.b = MEo[`+( j mod 2) ·ncNTT]
where c`in.a (respectively c
`
in.b) is the input coefficient a (respec-
tively b) of `th NTT core, MEe (respectively MEo) is the mem-
ory element at “even” (“odd”) read cycles, i.e., j mod 2 = 0
( j mod 2 = 1) where j is the step number. In Type 2 stages,
c`in.a (or c
`
in.b) should receive data from one of the coefficients
in ME depending on the value of ` and i. The naive approach
is to use one multiplexer (MUX) per each coefficient input of
every NTT core that selects one number from 2ncNTT fetched
numbers. We denote such multiplexer as MUX2ncNTT . As a
result, we need 2ncNTT-many MUX2ncNTT to pass coefficients
to NTT cores and the same number of MUXs to reorder them
to be written back to the memory. These MUXs not only
make the process of placement and route more challenging but
also consume enormous number of registers and logic blocks.
Moreover, scaling the NTT module to higher number of cores
(> 32) is inefficient due to super-linear resource consumption
with respect to ncNTT. In many cases, synthesis tools failed to
place and route the required resources to realize these MUXs.
In contrast, we take advantage of the fact that NTT cores’ in-
puts have a different number of possibilities from which they
select the correct coefficient at a given stage. For example,
during Type 2 stages, c0in.a only receives coefficients from first
word of MEs regardless of the stage or step number.
In the worst-case scenario, there are logncNTT different in-
dices from which a coefficient should be accessed from MEs
for a particular NTT core input. Therefore, instead of using
(4 ·ncNTT)-many MUX2ncNTT , we instantiate (4 ·ncNTT)-many
MUXs of size at most MUXlog2ncNTT . The selection signal
of these MUXs is set to s = logn− 1− i (i being the stage
number). The corresponding inputs (MUX{c`in.a}(α) and
MUX{c`in.b}(α)) from which a coefficient should be selected
are assigned based on the following formula:
=
MEs[(`&(2
s−1))+((i >> s)<< (s+ `))]
MEs[(`&(2s−1))+((i >> s)<< (s+ `))+2s]
where MUX{c`in.a}(α) is the α-th input wire of the MUX that
selects the corresponding input coefficient from MEs for `-
th NTT core, thus, 0 ≤ α < logncNTT. Creating customized
multiplexers for twiddle factors is significantly simpler. As
we discussed previously, during group i stages, only ME0 is
accessed and depending on the stage number, one or more of
its twiddle factors are selected and broadcasted to different
NTT cores. Therefore, from the perspective of each w`in (or
wp`in), there are logncNTT number of possibilities from which
the twiddle factor can be selected. This is implemented as
MUXlog2ncNTT . During group ii-iv stages, w`in (respectively
wp`in) is selected as MEw[`] (respectively MEwp[`]).
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Two-Stage Read, Compute, and Write. Storing polynomial
coefficients across different memory blocks solves simultane-
ous memory accesses. However, the NTT cores cannot be fully
utilized at all times due to the following reason. During Type 1
stages, coefficients that should be passed to each NTT core are
not located in the same memory element. Therefore, two dif-
ferent memory elements should be read (Readα1 and Readα2)
before the computation (Compα ) can start which introduces
50% bubble in the NTT core pipeline (please see Figure 4).
More precisely, first logn− logncNTT−1 stages face this prob-
lem. Given that NTT modules consume most of the FPGA
resources, this in turn means, the throughput of the entire
design will be reduced to (logn− logncNTT−1)/ logn.
In order to solve this problem, we propose to double the
size of MEs and store twice as many consecutive coefficients,
i.e., 2ncNTT, in each memory element. Meanwhile, we reduce
the depth of the memories that store the polynomial by half.
The modified pipeline is shown in Figure 4. Even though it
is still necessary to read two MEs (during two consecutive
cycles) before starting the computation, we can now transform
two MEs in the next two cycles (Compα1 and Compα2) and
store them back in the memory (Writeα1 and Writeα2). Our
solution does not reduce the delay of the computation but it
provides us the full utilization of NTT core during time. As
we will discuss in Section 6, BRAM is the most constrained
resource. In order to have minimal BRAM usage, all of the
reads and writes during different NTT stages are inplace, and
no additional BRAM is used to store intermediate values.
Read1 1 Read1 2 Read2 1 Read2 2
Read1 1 Read1 2 Read2 1 Read2 2
Basic Pipeline
Optimized Pipeline
Comp1 1 Comp2 1Comp1 2 Comp2 2
Write1 1 Write1 2 Write2 1 Write2 2
Comp1 Comp2 
Write1 1 Write1 2 Write2 1 Write2 2
Time
Figure 4: High-level pipeline of NTT module.
Putting it all together. Figure 3 illustrates the full architec-
ture of NTT module. On the three corners exist data memory,
twiddle factors’ memories, and output memory. Based on the
value of step and stage counters, the corresponding addresses
of the MEs for data and twiddle factor memories are generated.
At every cycle, one ME is fetched from data memory and is
stored in MEe and MEo registers every other cycles, respec-
tively. For each input coefficient of NTT cores, i.e., c`in.a and
c`in.b, a set of multiplexers select the correct coefficient from
MEe and MEo (depicted as light blue boxes in Figure 3).
During Type 1 stages, c`in.a is selected from one of the two
positions from MEe and c`in.b from MEo, respectively. This
selection is performed by MUX3. During Type 2 stages, first
one of the MEe or MEo is selected using 2ncNTT-many two-
to-one multiplexers (MUX1) and is stored in MEs registers.
Next, as we previously discussed, a customized multiplexer
is assigned for each specific operand (c`in.a or c
`
in.b) of a given
NTT core (MUX2) to select one of the coefficients within
MEs. Finally, MUX4 selects one of these two results based on
which stage type is getting processed. A similar set of MUXs
(MUX6 and MUX7) are used to reorder the data back in the
original locations before storing the result in the memory.
Once the final results are ready to be written in the memory
(ME4 and ME5), they will be stored in data memory during
two consecutive clock cycles. In the last stage, however, ME4
and ME5 are stored in output memory in order to keep the data
available for the next module(s).
Memory Utilization and Word-Packing. Storing multiple
polynomial coefficients (or twiddle factors) in multiple par-
allel memory units (M20K) can cause memory block under-
utilization both depth-size and width-size. Let us consider a
general scenario where β -many numbers are stored in parallel;
whether it is polynomial coefficients or twiddle factors.
Depth-wise: Each M20K memory unit holds 512-many 40-bit
wide words and at any cycle, one word can be read from or
written into the memory. When fewer than 512 words are
stored in the memory, the rest of the memory rows cannot be
used to store a secondary polynomial since at any point in
time we are reading/writing one word associated with the first
polynomial. As long as nβ ≥ 512, M20K is fully utilized. This
inequality generally holds in our hardware architecture except
when n= 212 (smallest polynomial size) and ncNTT = 16 which
makes M20K half utilized. However, this is not an issue since
our design is not BRAM-constrained when n = 212.
Width-wise: As the polynomial-size (n) grows, our design
becomes more and more BRAM-constrained to the extent that
at n = 214, there is not enough BRAM on the chip; thus, we
have to use DRAM as well (we will discuss this in more detail
in Section 5). Therefore, it is essential that the polynomials
are efficiently stored in memory. By storing each coefficient
in a separate physical BRAM, we will only reach 542·40 = 68%
utilization. In contrast, we pack multiple coefficients and store
them in fewer M20K units as shown in Figure 3 reaching
memory utilization of β ·54/(dβ ·54/40e ·40). For β = 8,
BRAM utilization will reach more than 98%.
Performance. The NTT module processes one stage in n2ncNTT
cycles. Computing the NTT of a polynomial takes logn stages,
and hence, it takes n logn2ncNTT cycles to compute one NTT.
INTT Module. Our NTT architecture can be used for both
NTT and INTT with only a few modifications: (i) the NTT
core is replaced by INTT core (see Figure 3), (ii) the control
unit operates in the reverse order of stage numbers, and (iii)
twiddle factor memories store the corresponding precomputed
values. The rest of the architecture remains unchanged.
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Figure 5: Architecture of KeySwitch module.
4.3. KeySwitch Module
KeySwitch is the most computationally intensive high-level
operation in the CKKS scheme. It has several important roles,
including relinearization and ciphertext rotation. In this sec-
tion, we describe our proposed architecture for this operation
as well as the challenges we faced during the design process.
Figure 5 illustrates the KeySwitch architecture. From the
functionality perspective, this architecture corresponds to Al-
gorithm 7. To reduce on-chip memory usage, the design takes
one polynomial (one RNS component) at a time and outputs
two polynomials. Recall that in CKKS, all polynomials are
in NTT form by default. Thus, once the input polynomial
is written into the input memory, it has to be converted back
to the original domain. This process is performed using the
first INTT module (INTT0). Next, the polynomial is trans-
formed to the NTT form for all other primes (including the
special prime). Since per each INTT computation, we have
to perform k NTT, the throughput of the NTT module(s) has
to be k-times the throughput of INTT0. Here, k is the number
of RNS components of ciphertext modulus, i.e., L+1. This
requirement can be realized in two different ways: (i) having
one NTT module with k-many more cores than INTT0 or (ii)
having multiple NTT module with fewer cores per each mod-
ule. We denote this NTT module (or a set of them) as NTT0.
We will discuss the trade-offs later in this section. In Figure 5,
the second approach (using more than one NTT module) is
chosen for n = 213 and k = 4 parameter set.
In the NTT/INTT module, the intermediate results are
read/written from internal memory and the final results are
written to the output memory. Once the NTT computations
are finished, the DyadMult module computes the dyadic prod-
uct between the output of NTT modules and the relineariza-
tion/Galois keys according to Algorithm 7. Recall that a
dyadic product on the original input polynomial is also needed
in KeySwitch; thus, a separate Dyadic module is used. After
dyadic product computation, the result is stored in the corre-
sponding memory banks. There are two sets of BRAM banks,
each bank containing the RNS components of one polynomial.
The computation flow described above repeats for k-many
times (one per each RNS component). The result is accumu-
lated in the BRAM banks. After k iterations, the second part
of the computation – usually referred to as Modulus Switch-
ing (developed in [12]) – is performed. In Modulus Switch-
ing which executes Floor, the polynomial corresponding to
the special prime has to be transformed back to the time do-
main (by INTT1) and then be transformed using every other
k primes (by NTT1). The aforementioned process is indepen-
dently performed for both sets of banks. Next, the polynomial
is multiplied by the inverse value of the associated prime and
subtracted from the result of the first half of KeySwitch compu-
tation. The MS module embeds multiplication and subtraction
operations. The output of KeySwitch is stored as two sets of k
polynomials referred to as “Output Poly 0/1” in Figure 5.
Balancing Throughput. Our primary goal in designing
KeySwitch architecture is to have a fully end-to-end pipelined
module that can process many key switching operations simul-
taneously without any (or excessive) FIFOs between different
components. Thus, we have to tune the throughput of each
component carefully. As we discussed in Section 4.2, this is
one of the reasons to design a flexible architecture for NTT, the
throughput of which can be adjusted based on the number of
cores that it encompasses. According to Algorithm 7, per each
initial INTT, we have to compute k NTTs. In the next part, we
will discuss two main approaches to realize this requirement.
Number of Cores vs. Number of Modules: To balance the
throughput of INTT0 and NTT0, one can allocate a single
NTT module with ncNTT0 = k ·ncINTT0 . However, in practice,
having a very large NTT module with more than 32 cores
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results in place-and-route failures during hardware synthesis.
Moreover, recall from Section 4.2 that the ALM consumption
of NTT module grows faster than linear with respect to the
number of cores: O
(
ncNTT0 logncNTT0
)
. Therefore, breaking
total number of NTT cores into separate modules results in
less ALM consumption and more robust hardware synthesis.
The downside of this approach is more BRAM utilization
since each NTT module has its own internal data memory (for
holding intermediate values) as well as the output memory.
Considering all other restrictions and requirements, we
choose multiple NTT modules over a single big one. In gen-
eral, let’s denote the number of NTT0 as m0 (assuming a power
of two number). Thus, we have: ncNTT0 = k ·ncINTT0/m0.
Next, we can compute the number of cores needed for
DyadMult module. Recall from Section 4.2 that it takes
(n logn)/(2ncNTT0) cycles for NTT module to finish the com-
putation. The DyadMult module has to compute the product
of NTT output with two different sets of keys (ksk=D0 | D1).
It takes (2n)/ncDYD cycles to perform dyadic multiplication
on the output of the NTT module. Since in general, logn is
not a power of two, the throughputs do not perfectly match.
We make sure that the throughput of Dyadic module is greater
than that of (or equal to) the NTT module by satisfying the
following inequality:
2n
ncDYD
6 n logn
2ncNTT0
⇒ ncDYD =
⌈
4ncNTT0
logn
⌉
The throughput of INTT1 modules can be adjusted by as-
signing ncINTT1 =
⌈
ncINTT0/k
⌉
. One can also determine ncNTT1 =
ncINTT0 and ncMS = d(2ncNTT1)/ logne. For two FPGA chips
that we have implemented HEAX on, the optimal architecture
parameters are computed and summarized in Table 5.
Simultaneous KeySwitch Ops. and Synchronization. Fig-
ure 6 shows the high-level pipeline of KeySwitch module for
n = 213 (third row of Table 5). All of the modules – and their
internal components – are pipelined, and the throughput is
balanced. As can be seen, multiple key switching operations
are computed simultaneously in different pipeline stages (in
lighter colors). The fifth Dyadic module that operates on input
polynomial BRAM is synchronized with the rest of the Dyadic
modules even though the computation can be started as soon
as the input poly is available. The reason is that during each of
the k iterations of Dyadic product, each module computes and
accumulates the results by reading/writing from/to a separate
BRAM bank. This enables us to avoid any memory replication
considering that these memory banks are prohibitively large.
However, this delayed computation introduces a dependency
problem in the pipeline referred to as “Data Dependency 1”.
By the time the k-th Dyadic module starts the computation,
the content of input poly is overridden by the next key switch-
ing operation. As a result, we allocate enough BRAM to
hold f1-many polynomials. The value of f1 depends on the
architecture parameter, more precisely: f1 =
⌈
3+
ncINTT0
ncNTT0
⌉
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Figure 6: High-level pipeline of KeySwitch module.
Similarly, one of the inputs of the MS module is coming
from the output of DyadMult modules, which will be overrid-
den by subsequent results. This is marked as “Data Depen-
dency 2” in Figure 6. Thus, we need to allocate more memory
to store the outcome of the DyadMult modules in f2 different
buffers. The value of f2 can be computed as
f2 =
⌈
1+m0 · ncINTT1ncNTT1
+
ncINTT1 · logn
ncMS
⌉
Memory Read/Write Rate Conversion. Recall that we pack
and store multiple words in parallel to minimize BRAM uti-
lization while supporting simultaneous accesses. Given that
each module is consuming and producing a different num-
ber of words at a time, we need to make any two subsequent
modules compatible in terms of memory read/write rate.
Down-Scale Conversion: This procedure is needed when the
number of words that have to be read in the next module is
lower than the current module. For example, going from NTT0
to DyadMult, we need to reduce the number of values we store
in parallel. We satisfy this constraint by writing the output into
multiple M20K units without overlap. This inevitably results
in lower BRAM saturation both width-wise and depth-wise.
Up-Scale Conversion: This procedure is used, for example,
between INTT1 and NTT1. Consider that the conversion rate
is r, meaning that every r cycles, the result of previous block
has to be written into one memory row. Therefore, during r-
many cycles, the results are temporarily stored in registers and
they will be written into certain number of M20Ks in parallel.
We leverage the data compaction approach that we described
in Section 4.2 in order to increase BRAM saturation.
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5. SYSTEM-VIEW and DATA FLOW
In this section, we discuss a higher-level view of the com-
putation and elaborate on the data flow. Figure 7 shows a
system-view comprising host CPU and FPGA Board which
are connected via Peripheral Component Interconnect express
(PCIe) bus. On FPGA board, exist the FPGA chip as well as
off-chip DRAM memory connected via DDR interface.
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Figure 7: System-view.
5.1. On-Chip vs. Off-Chip Memory Accesses
There are two main ways to store data on FPGA board: (i)
off-chip DRAM with several Gigabytes of capacity but high
response delay and (ii) on-chip BRAM with few Megabits
of capacity but very fast response time and high throughput.
As has been shown by prior art [66, 67], leveraging off-chip
memory to store intermediate results significantly reduces the
overall performance due to high delays between subsequent
reads and writes. One of our primary design goals is to avoid
off-chip memory access as much as possible. We have in-
troduced several techniques to use minimal on-chip memory,
re-use many BRAM units, together with data compaction (see
Section 4.2 and Section 4.3). As a result, no off-chip memory
access is performed for n = 212 parameter set on both Arria
10 and Stratix 10 FPGAs; which is one of the main reasons
for our unprecedented performance improvements.
For n = 213 parameter set, there is sufficient on-chip mem-
ory on Stratix 10 chip. Unfortunately, for n = 214, there is not
enough BRAM available for our design, and as a result, we
have to move some part of the data to off-chip memory. In
order to minimize the effect of off-chip memory accesses, we
choose to put key switching keys (ksk) on DRAM because of
two main reasons: (i) the size of these keys grow very rapidly
with HE parameters. In general, the size of ksk grows as
O
(
nk2
)
, and roughly speaking, k grows linearly with n which
results in (almost) O
(
n3
)
. This is the highest growth rate
compared to all other memory components, including twiddle
factors which grow as O
(
nk
)
. (ii) ksk is only read once per
each KeySwitch. Note that each unique element of twiddle
factors is read k times during one KeySwitch operation; thus,
twiddle factors are less suitable candidates.
We distribute the ksk among four different DRAM banks
such that at any point in time, the full capacity of off-chip
memory bandwidth is used. In order to further mask the effect
of DRAM accesses, we leverage the burst mode in which a
long sequence of data is read at the same time on each channel.
The entire process of reading ksk from DRAM is pipelined
to minimize the drop in throughput of KeySwitch. It is worth-
mentioning that DRAM bandwidth is sufficient to match the
throughput of KeySwitch. Per each KeySwitch, two sets of
ksk have to be streamed to FPGA chip. Each of these sets,
hold k ·(k+1)-many vectors of size n. Substituting n = 214,
k = 8, and 64-bit per each word results in ≈ 151 Mega bits.
We have to stream this volume of data in 383 microseconds
(please see Table 8). Therefore, DRAM bandwidth should
be higher than 49.28 GBps, which is indeed lower than the
measured bandwidth of all four channels combined.
In addition to storing ksk, we use DRAM for one more
purpose. In some applications, it is more efficient to store the
result of computation on DRAM instead of sending them back
to CPU in case these results are going to be used later on. The
address at which the result is stored is held on the CPU side
and is shown as “Memory Map”. The memory map is used to
point to the ciphertext(s) that are stored on DRAM to be used
during the rest of the computation without involving PCIe.
5.2. Data Transfer on PCIe
In order to maximize the utilization of computation blocks on
FPGA, we need to interleave computation and data transfer
between FPGA and CPU. We divide this design process into
two parts: CPU-side and FPGA-side. On the CPU-side, we
need to sequence and batch multiple operations in the program
(that uses SEAL) and start the data transfer process on PCIe
using multiple threads. On the FPGA-side, we need to allocate
the necessary buffers to store the data received from CPU.
Sequencing and Batching. Transferring data on PCIe in-
volves three main steps: (i) a memcpy is issued to copy the
content of the polynomial to pinned memory pages, (ii) CPU
signals FPGA that the data is ready, and (iii) FPGA reads the
data from PCIe. In order to reduce the time that takes to copy
the data, Direct Memory Access (DMA) is used. However,
even by relying on DMA, the maximum throughput that PCIe
can provide depends on the message size and the number of
simultaneous data transfer requests. Therefore, we transfer
(at least) a complete polynomial (215−217 Bytes) in each re-
quest. Moreover, we implement a multi-threaded data transfer
mechanism that uses eight threads to interleave eight separate
polynomials at a time to maximize the PCIe throughput and
avoid unnecessary bubbles in the computation pipeline.
Double and Quadruple Buffering. For the MULT module,
it suffices to double-buffer the input such that CPU writes to
one of these buffers and FPGA reads from the other one. For
KeySwitch module, however, we need to perform quadruple
buffering due to the data dependency on input polynomial as
discussed in Section 4.3. In order to make sure buffers are not
overridden before they are read, we stop the writing process if
the buffer has not been read yet.
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6. IMPLEMENTATION and EXPERIMENTS
6.1. Experimental Setup
In this section, we elaborate in detail on the resource con-
sumption of each component of our design starting from com-
putation cores and moving to basic and high-level modules.
We also provide our experimental results and compare the
performance of HEAX to Microsoft SEAL execution on CPU.
We implement HEAX on two Intel FPGAs considering two
different scales to illustrate the adaptability of HEAX:
• Board-A: with an Intel Arria 10 GX 1150 chip, 4 GB of
DRAM memory with two independent DRAM channels, and
PCIe Gen3 with eight lanes providing 7.88 GBps bandwidth
in each direction from host CPU to FPGA and vice versa.
• Board-B: with Intel Stratix 10 GX 2800 chip, 64 GB of
DRAM memory with four independent DRAM channels, and
PCIe Gen3 with 16 lanes enabling 15.75 GBps bandwidth in
each direction from host CPU to FPGA and vice versa. Each
DRAM channel has a unidirectional bandwidth of 16 GBps
based on the DDR4 interface.
There are three major types of resources that are available
on the FPGA chip:
• Digital Signal Processing (DSP) units that are able to per-
form one 27-bit or two 18-bit multiplications.
• Adaptive Logic Modules (ALM) that represent core logic
units and provide two combinational adaptive look-up tables,
a two-bit full adder, and four Registers (REG) that are capable
to hold a 1-bit value each.
• Block RAM (BRAM) units that represent on-chip memories
for fast read and write operations. BRAM consists of M20K
units that hold 512-many 40-bit values.
Table 1 summarizes the breakdown of resources available
on each FPGA chip as well as the connections to DRAM.
Board Chip
Chip Resources DRAM
DSP REG ALM BRAM #chnl. BWbits #M20K (GBps)
Board-A Arria 10 GX 1150 1518 1.71M 427K 53Mb 2.7K 2 34
Board-B Stratix 10 GX 2800 5760 3.73M 933K 229Mb 11.7K 4 64
Table 1: Summary of FPGA boards’ specifications.
We evaluate our design on a wide range of HE parameters:
from ciphertext polynomial size (n) of 212 and 109-bit ci-
phertext modulus (blogqpc+1) to 214 with 438-bit ciphertext
modulus. We refer to these parameter sets as Set-A, Set-B, and
Set-C, respectively (summarized in Table 2). Recall that k is
the number of small RNS components of ciphertext modulus.
HE Param. Set n blogqpc+1 k
Set-A 212 109 2
Set-B 213 218 4
Set-C 214 438 8
Table 2: Description of HE parameter sets. n is the ciphertext
polynomial size, qp is the ciphertext modulus, and k is the
number of RNS components of q.
These parameters are selected based on the HE security
standards [1] for 128-bit classical security. Parameters with
128-bit post-quantum security require slightly smaller cipher-
text moduli, hence are easier to implement on an FPGA. We
selected as few prime moduli for RNS as possible since they
are critical to performance according to analysis in [37]. Note
that parameter sets corresponding to 211 (or lower) are al-
most never used in practice due to the multiplication depth
of 1 (or zero). Choosing 215 (or higher) results in enormous
computation blow-up and are also rarely used in practice.
We compare the performance of HEAX with Microsoft
SEAL V3.3 [69], which is an FHE library for BFV and CKKS
schemes that has undergone several years of performance
optimizations. We measure the performance of SEAL on a
single-threaded Intel Xeon(R) Silver 4108 running at 1.80
GHz; which is a similar CPU used in prior art [67].
6.2. Resource Consumption
Computation Cores. Table 3 provides a detailed resource
consumption of Dyadic, NTT, and INTT computation cores as
well as the number of pipeline stages (delay) for each core.
Core Name DSP REG ALM #Stages
Dyadic 22 4526 1663 23
NTT 10 6297 2066 50
INTT 10 5449 2119 49
Table 3: Resource consumption of each core type.
Basic Modules. Table 4 provides a detailed resource con-
sumption of shell as well as different modules for a various
number of cores within the module. The BRAM utilization
results are reported for Set-B parameters (n = 213). As can be
seen, BRAM bits usage in each module does not depend on the
number of cores. However, as the number of core grows, more
coefficients are stored in parallel which results in consuming
more M20K units. In the last column, the number of cycles
that takes for each module to process a polynomial (or pair of
polynomials in case of MULT module) is reported.
Module #Cores DSP REG ALM BRAM Cycles#bits #M20K
A10 Shell - 1 79203 39222 886496 144 -
S10 Shell - 2 86984 45612 1201096 173 -
MULT
4 88 42817 15795
11
04
38
4 65 1024
8 176 61878 22160 65 512
16 352 93594 35257 164 128
32 704 181503 62157 293 64
NTT
4 40 61670 22316
15
14
49
6 86 6144
8 80 96919 36336 185 3072
16 160 196205 67865 380 1536
32 320 387357 142300 725 768
INTT
4 40 63917 22700
15
14
49
6 86 6144
8 80 104575 37331 185 3072
16 160 182478 68645 380 1536
32 320 384267 144957 724 768
Table 4: Resource consumption of basic modules.
Complete Design. Table 6 provides a breakdown of FPGA
resource consumption for different HE parameter sets. The
complete design encompasses the KeySwitch module along
with the MULT module. For standalone NTT requests from
CPU, the NTT modules within KeySwitch is used.
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FPGA Device HE Param. Set KeySwitch Architecture Parameter Set
Arria10 n = 212 (Set-A) 1× INTT(8)→ 2×NTT(8)→ 3×Dyad(4)→ 2× INTT(4)→ 2×NTT(8)→ 2×Mult(2)
Stratix10
n = 212 (Set-A) 1× INTT(16)→ 2×NTT(16)→ 3×Dyad(8)→ 2× INTT(8)→ 2×NTT(16)→ 2×Mult(4)
n = 213 (Set-B) 1× INTT(16)→ 4×NTT(16)→ 5×Dyad(8)→ 2× INTT(4)→ 2×NTT(16)→ 2×Mult(4)
n = 214 (Set-C) 1× INTT(8)→ 4×NTT(16)→ 5×Dyad(8)→ 2× INTT(1)→ 2×NTT(8)→ 2×Mult(4)
Table 5: KeySwitch architecture for different HE parameter sets.
FPGA Device HE Param. Set DSP (%) REG (%) ALM (%) BRAM bits (%) BRAM #M20K (%) Freq. (MHz)
Arria10 Set-A 1185 (78) 723188 (42) 246323 (58) 26596320 (48) 1731 (64) 275
Stratix10
Set-A 2018 (35) 1554005 (42) 582148 (62) 26907592 (11) 3986 (34) 300
Set-B 2610 (45) 1976162 (53) 698884 (75) 201332624 (84) 10340 (88) 300
Set-C 2370 (41) 1746384 (47) 599715 (64) 182847524 (76) 9329 (80) 300
Table 6: Resource consumption of HEAX for different HE parameter sets.
FPGA Device HE Param. Set NTT INTT Dyadic MULTCPU HEAX Speed-up CPU HEAX Speed-up CPU HEAX Speed-up
Arria10 Set-A 7222 89518 12.4 7568 89518 11.8 36931 1074219 29.1
Stratix10
Set-A 7222 195313 27.0 7568 195313 25.8 36931 1171875 31.7
Set-B 3437 90144 26.2 3539 90144 25.5 18362 585938 31.9
Set-C 1631 41853 25.7 1659 41853 25.2 9117 292969 32.1
Table 7: Performance comparison of HEAX with CPU. Number of operations per second for CKKS low-level operations.
FPGA Device HE Param. Set KeySwitch MULT+ReLinCPU HEAX Speed-up CPU HEAX Speed-up
Arria10 Set-A 488 44759 91.7 420 44759 106.6
Stratix10
Set-A 488 97656 200.5 420 97656 232.5
Set-B 97 22536 232.3 84 22536 268.3
Set-C 16 2616 163.5 15 2616 174.4
Table 8: Performance comparison of HEAX with CPU. Number of operations per second for CKKS high-level operations.
6.3. Performance
Critical Paths and Maximum Clock Frequency. The FPGA
operating clock frequency directly affects the performance;
thus, we have analyzed the critical paths of our design and have
eliminated such paths during many design iterations. These
modifications include but are not limited to: altering the data
flow of computation and reducing the fan-out as well as data
dependency among registers, breaking large multiplexers into
smaller ones, and minimizing the number of levels of logic
per pipeline stage. The final maximum clock frequency that
are achieved for Arria 10 and Stratix 10 FPGA chips are 275
MHz and 300 MHz, respectively.
Scalability. One of the desirable features of HEAX is that
it can automatically be instantiated at different scales (with
no manual tuning) based on the available hardware resources.
To illustrate the scalability and adaptability of our design, we
have instantiated HEAX for the same HE parameters (Set-
A) but at two different scales (see Table 5). As can be seen
from Table 6, the up-scaled instantiation on Stratix 10 con-
sumes (close to) twice the resources and provides twice the
throughput compared to Arria 10 instantiation (see Table 8).
This property enables cloud providers to seamlessly instantiate
HEAX based on the underlying application, HE parameters,
and available FPGA resources.
Performance Comparison. Table 7 shows the performance
results (number of operations per second) of HEAX for low-
level operations and its comparison with Microsoft SEAL
execution on CPU. The performance results are reported for
processing a single polynomial (in case of NTT/INTT) or pair
of polynomials (Dyadic MULT). On Stratix 10, 16-core mod-
ules are instantiated for NTT/INTT and MULT. On Arria 10, a
16-core MULT and 8-core NTT/INTT modules are used (see
Table 5). Note that we report the performance results for low-
level operation merely for completeness. These operations are
rarely used in isolation and are instead used as part of high-
level operations. For high-level operations, i.e., Rotation and
Relinearization (using KeySwitch) and a complete ciphertext
multiplication (using MULT and KeySwitch), the performance
improvements are more pronounced; because many of such
operations can be executed in parallel compared to CPU.
Table 8 shows the performance results as well as the speed-
up for high-level operations in CKKS scheme. As can be seen,
HEAX achieves close to two orders of magnitude performance
improvement using Arria 10 FPGA (Board-A) compared to
CPU (first row of Table 8). On a more powerful FPGA, i.e.,
Intel Stratix 10 (Board-B), HEAX achieves 164-268× per-
formance improvements among various HE parameter sets
compared to CPU (second to fourth rows of Table 8).
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7. RELATED WORK
Homomorphic encryption can fundamentally change the trust
and computation model of many applications and industries.
For example, in Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS),
the privacy of users’ data as well we the confidentiality of the
cloud server’s ML model can be preserved. Privacy-preserving
MLaaS has been studied rigorously in recent years and sev-
eral protocol-level and algorithmic improvements have been
proposed [36, 48, 63, 46, 19, 64, 62, 61, 42]. However, the
computation overhead compared to the traditional plaintext
execution remains a standing challenge.
The CKKS scheme is one of the most recently proposed
FHE schemes that allows homomorphic operations on fixed-
point numbers; making it the prime candidate for machine
learning applications. To the best of our knowledge, no hard-
ware architecture has been proposed for the CKKS scheme,
and in this paper, we propose the first of its kind. As a result, it
is not fair to compare the performance of HEAX with previous
designs that focus on non-CKKS schemes. In what follows,
we briefly review the research effort related to FPGA, ASIC,
and GPU-based acceleration for non-CKKS schemes as well
as (non-HE) secure computation protocols.
Hardware Acceleration for non-CKKS Schemes. In [66],
a system based on FPGA is proposed for BFV scheme to
process ciphertext polynomial sizes of 215. However, due to
the massive off-chip data transfer, their design does not yield
superior performance compared to CPU execution.
Perhaps, the closest work to ours is by Roy et al. [67] in
which authors propose an architecture for BFV scheme and
implement their design on Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC
ZCU102. In order to avoid off-chip memory accesses, authors
focus on n = 212 ciphertext sizes and report 13× speed-up
(using two instances of their proposed processors) compared
to the FV-NFLlib [33] executing on an Intel i5 processor run-
ning at 1.8 GHz. However, compared to a more optimized
Microsoft SEAL library [68], FV-NFLlib is 1.2× slower [6].
In addition, our design is significantly more modular and scal-
able. We have instantiated HEAX for three different set of HE
parameters with no manual tuning (polynomial sizes of 212,
213, and 214). Moreover, HEAX has a multi-layer pipelined
design and is drastically more efficient, offering more than
two orders of magnitude performance improvement compared
to Microsoft SEAL running on Intel Xeon Silver 4108 at 1.8
GHz (note that similar processor is used compared with [67]
running at identical frequency).
FPGA-based Co-Processors. Designing co-processors has
also been studied in the literature. These co-processors work
in conjunction with CPUs and accelerate one or more of the
homomorphic operations [45, 55, 21, 38, 56, 49]. In [55]
and [38, 56], authors focus on designing hardware architecture
for the encryption operation only, by leveraging Karatsuba
and Comba multiplication algorithms, respectively. In [21],
a Homomorphic Encryption Processing Unit (HEPU) is pro-
posed for LTV scheme [53]. Authors focus on accelerating the
Chinese Remainder Transform (CRT) for power-of-2 cyclo-
tomic rings and report 3.2-4.4× performance improvements
for homomorphic multiplication using Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA.
Large-Integer Multiplication Hardware Acceleration. A
line of research focuses on designing very large integer multi-
pliers – based on FPGAs or ASICs – that can be used to ac-
celerate homomorphic operations [74, 75, 28, 29, 13]. These
architectures support 768K-bit to 1.18M-bit multiplications.
In [14], a large-integer multiplier and a Barrett modular
reduction are proposed that can accelerate HE operations by
11×. However, the performance degradation due to the off-
chip memory accesses are not considered in this work which
can be the main bottleneck as reported by prior art [67, 60]. In
contrast, HEAX does not rely on large-integer multiplication,
and instead, leverages the parallelism based on RNS to achieve
efficient routing and superior performance.
GPU-based HE Acceleration. Graphics Processing Unit
(GPU) is an alternative computing platform to accelerate
evaluation in HE [25, 22, 57, 5, 50, 72]. Wang et al. [72]
have proposed the first GPU acceleration of FHE that targets
Gentry-Halevi [35] scheme. Subsequent improvements are
reported in [73]. In [71], a GPU-based implementation of
BGV scheme [11] is introduced. In [5], a comprehensive
study is reported for multithreaded CPU execution as well as
GPU implementation of the BFV scheme. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no GPU-accelerated implementation of
the CKKS scheme. GPUs normally offer less performance
per watt of power than FPGAs by design. Therefore, FPGAs
are more suitable candidates for high-performance, low-power
secure computation in the cloud.
Acceleration of YASHE and LTV Schemes. Several
works [58, 24, 27, 59, 20, 21] focus on improving the perfor-
mance of YASHE [9] and LTV [53] schemes or their variants.
These constructions – based on an overstretched NTRU as-
sumption – are subject to a subfield lattice attack [2] and are no
longer secure. Nevertheless, the contribution in optimization
techniques remain valuable.
In what follows, we briefly review two of the most relevant
designs to ours. In [65], an architecture for YASHE scheme is
proposed that provides 25× performance improvement over
CPU. However, authors assume unlimited memory bandwidth
which renders off-chip memory accesses free of cost and is not
a realistic assumption. Pöppelmann et al. [60] have also pro-
posed an architecture for YASHE scheme. Since ciphertexts
are prohibitively large to be stored on on-chip memory, authors
propose to leverage the idea of Cached-NTT [3, 4]. Cached-
NTT suggests formulating the NTT of large polynomials as
many invocations of a fixed computation with the property that
loading/saving intermediate results from/to off-chip memory
is minimized, thus, the notion of cached. Cached-NTT mini-
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mizes the number of times off-chip memory transactions are
performed since the off-chip memory access is significantly
costlier compared with on-chip memory access. In contrast, in
HEAX, we rely on the ring isomorphism property and perform
independent computation on each RNS component of large
ciphertext. This, in turn, allows us to avoid off-chip mem-
ory accesses for small-size HE parameters and minimize such
accesses for large parameters.
Hardware Acceleration of Secure Computation Protocols.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) protocols can also
be used for the task of privacy-preserving MLaaS. The Garbled
Circuits protocol [76] is one of the secure two-party computa-
tion protocols for which FPGA-based accelerators have been
proposed [43, 32, 44]. However, compared to HE, the com-
munication between parties is significantly higher, making
the end-to-end protocol mostly bandwidth constrained. Thus,
accelerating the computation portion of SMPC protocols does
not necessarily reduce the execution time of the protocol in
general. In contrast, the main bottleneck of HE is the computa-
tion overhead and reducing the homomorphic evaluation time
directly increases the practicality of HE-based computations.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a novel set of architectures
for Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). To the best of
our knowledge, HEAX is the first architecture and fully-
implemented hardware acceleration for the CKKS FHE
scheme. CKKS is the prime candidate for machine learning
on encrypted data due to floating-point support of this scheme.
The components designed in HEAX can also be used for other
lattice-based cryptosystems and other FHE/HE schemes. The
proposed architecture provides a unique degree of flexibility
that can be readily adjusted for various FPGA chips. As a
proof-of-concept, we have implemented HEAX on two differ-
ent FPGAs with contrasting hardware resources. Moreover,
unlike prior FPGA-based acceleration for BFV scheme, our
design is not tied to a specific FHE parameter set. We evaluate
HEAX on a wide range of FHE parameters demonstrating
more than two orders of magnitude performance improve-
ments. We hope that HEAX paves the way for large-scale
deployment of privacy-preserving computation in clouds.
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